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The facts of NH v Lenford concerned statements made by a senior lawyer in a radio interview, 
which suggested that he would never hire a gay person to work in his law firm, nor wish to use the 
services of such a person. The Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) determined that 
this contravened relevant legislation prohibiting discrimination in employment, even though the 
statements were made without a recruitment procedure being underway. The CJEU and the Italian 
Court of Cassation when implementing the CJEU judgment both found that the person making 
such statements was influential on the firm’s recruitment policy and that compensation was 
payable to the applicants – the Associazione Avvocatura per i diritti LGBTI (the ‘Associazione’), 
a non-profit 1ecognizes1n representing the general interest of LGBT lawyers – even in the absence 
of an individual victim. Contrary to the suggestion of other authors, that sexual orientation 
discrimination is low down the hierarchy of protected characteristics before the EU legislation 
and CJEU, this article argues that NH v Lenford demonstrates a further step in the continuing 
evolution of LGBT non-discrimination rights before the European Union.  Following Brexit whilst 
existing EU laws already translated into the UK legislative cannon will be retained, further EU 
legislation and rulings from the CJEU will not apply to the UK. The Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement (‘TCA’) reached between the UK and EU includes protection of human rights, a ‘non-
regression’ and re-balancing clauses with regards to labour and social policy, and thus, enables 
the EU and UK continuing, albeit limited, influence on each other. 
 
1. Introduction 
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NH v Lenford concerned a request to the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) for a 
preliminary ruling from the Italian Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation, 
Italy)1. The case was brought by a legal entity, the Associazione Avvocatura per i diritti LGBTI 
(the ‘Associazione’), representing the collective interest of LGBT (this acronym is used here for 
functional purposes to refer to lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans) lawyers. They complained that 
statements made by a senior lawyer, NH, in a radio programme which suggested that the solicitors’ 
firm where he worked would never hire or use the services of gay persons contravened relevant 
EU non-discrimination provisions against LGBT persons2. The CJEU had to determine whether 
statements made during the course of a radio interview fell within relevant EU protections, even 
though the statements were made at a time when no current or planned recruitment procedures 
were ongoing3. A further question to be addressed was whether the Associazione could bring a 
case representing LGBT persons, even though there were no individual named victims in the case. 
The CJEU adopted a purposive interpretation of EU law to determine both answers in the 
affirmative4. Of relevance was the fact that the statements were made by a person perceived to 
have influence on recruitment policy, which could prejudice applicants in deciding against future 
job applications5. In allowing compensation to be payable to a third-party representative 
organisation, in the absence of individual named victims, this meant that cases could be brought 
forwards, without needing for individuals to ‘out’ themselves. The Italian Court of Cassation 
applied the preliminary ruling to allow the representative organisation to bring the action on behalf 
of its constituent members6. They also found that statements fell within the material scope of 
Directive 2000/77 and that there was sufficient link between the statements made and the 
employer8. 
The next section analyses how historically the EU, constrained by a lack of competence to act, 
demonstrated much self-restraint towards developing LGBT discrimination cases and adopted a 
conservative approach. This led to authors considering that the CJEU had stopped moving forward 
in this area9, or that a hierarchy of protected rights exists10, with LGBT persons either not 
                                                             
1 European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, April 23rd 2020, Case C‑507/18 NH v. Associazione Avvocatura per i 
Diritti LGBTI – Rete Lenford (‘NH v Lenford’). 
2 Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a General Framework for Equal treatment in Employment and Occupation 
Prohibiting Discrimination on the Grounds of Religion or Belief, Disability, Age and Sexual Orientation.  
3 Of most relevance was Article 3 of Directive 2000/78 (Ibid.) which provides that Article 3 “Within the limits of the 
areas of competence conferred on the Community, this Directive shall apply to all persons, as regards both the public 
and private sectors, including public bodies, in relation to: (a) conditions for access to employment, to self-
employment or to occupation, including selection criteria and recruitment conditions, whatever the branch of activity 
and at all levels of the professional hierarchy, including promotion;(b) access to all types and to all levels of vocational 
guidance, vocational training, advanced vocational training and retraining, including practical work experience; (c) 
employment and working conditions, including dismissals and pay; (d) membership of, and involvement in, an 
organisation of workers or employers, or any organisation whose members carry on a particular profession, including 
the benefits provided for by such organisations”. 
4 NH v Lenford (n1). 
5 Ibid.  
6 Italian Court of Cassation, Section I Civil Ordinance 15 December 2020, n. 28646 at paragraphs 2.4.1 - 2.4.4.  
7 Ibid. para 5.6. 
8 Ibid. para 5.8.  
9 E. Howard, S. Benedi Lahuerta and A. Zbyszewska, ‘EU Anti-Discrimination Law: Has the CJEU Stopped Moving 
Forward?’ International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 2018-06, Vol 18 (2-3) p. 60 – 81. 
10 See Ibid.  
   
 
   
 
protected11, or less well protected from discrimination12.  In further sections the author sets forward 
the argument that although much work remains to be done, NH v Lenford is a case example 
demonstrating the continuing evolution of LGBT non-discrimination rights at EU level13. This has 
been done through a series of new legislative tools which include the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights14, through expanding protection from discrimination in employment law legislation15, and 
through case law of the CJEU in the area of free movement, where the Court has interpreted the 
term ‘spouse’ to include the same-sex spouse of a Union citizen for the purpose of granting family 
reunification rights under EU law16. As a British author, the article also contains consideration of 
the position following Brexit. For a wider audience the points are also relevant as they illustrate 
how far EU legislation and CJEU judgments have forced Member States to protect LGBT rights. 
Following Brexit, new EU legislation and judgments from the CJEU will no longer take automatic 
effect in the UK.  The Trade and Cooperation Agreement (’TCA’) commits the UK and the EU to 
upholding ’shared values, principles of democracy and a respect for human rights…’17 a non-
regression clause in relation to existing labour law, including fundamental rights at work18 as well 
as potential ’rebalancing’ provisions in the area of labour law between the EU and UK19. As 
discussed in the final section, in some limited extent, this may allow the opportunity for the EU 
and the UK to continue to influence each other in the area of LGBT non-discrimination law. 
However, the author suggests that the required hurdles of effect on ’trade or investment between 
the parties’20 as regards non-regression, and ’significant divergence’ in labour law leading to a 
’material impact on trade or investment’ as regards rebalancing21, will be very difficult tests to 
meet in practice. 
   
2. Past Treatment of LGBT Persons before the CJEU 
 
                                                             
11 See for example, European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, February 17th 1998, Case C-249/96, Grant v. South 
West Trains, (1998) 1 CMLR 993. 
12For example see European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, January 7th 2004, Case 117/ 01 KB v NHS Pensions 
Agency. 
13 See NH v Lenford (n1). 
14 EU Charter of Fundamental Human Rights of the European Union. 
15 See for example Directive 2000/43/EC prohibiting racial and ethnic origin discrimination and Directive 
2000/78/EC,2 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation prohibiting 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation. 
16 European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, June 5th 2018, Case C-673/16 Relu Coman and Others v. Inspectoratul 
General pentru Imigrari and Others. 
17 Trade and Cooperation Agreement, TITLE II: BASIS FOR COOPERATION Article COMPROV.4: Democracy, 
rule of law and human rights 1. The Parties shall continue to uphold the shared values and principles of democracy, 
the rule of law, and respect for human rights, which underpin their domestic and international policies. In that regard, 
the Parties reaffirm their respect for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international human rights 
treaties to which they are parties. 
18 Trade and Cooperation Agreement, Title XI: Level Playing Field for Open and Fair Competition and Sustainable 
Development Art 6.1 applies to ‘labour and social levels of protection’ which under Art 6.2 ‘non-regression clause 
both parties agree not to ‘weaken or reduce, in a manner affecting trade or investment between the parties...’  
19 Trade and Cooperation Agreement Article 9.4 Rebalancing. 
20 Article 6.2: Non-regression from levels of protection para 2. 
21 Trade and Cooperation Agreement Article 9.4 Rebalancing. 
   
 
   
 
EU protection of LGBT persons from discrimination evolved by EU legislation increasing 
competences across human rights and discrimination law and subsequent purposive interpretation 
by the CJEU22. In the past CJEU case law determined that sexual orientation would not fall within 
a sex discrimination ground23. This meant as Howard sets out that ‘the EU did not have the 
competence to act against discrimination on the wider grounds beyond sex discrimination…’24 In 
addition, where free movement of persons was concerned, only traditional family formats were 
recognised within the scope of family life as defined by EU legislation25. As a result, prior to recent 
case law26, non-EU national same-sex spouses could not relocate with their EU citizen spouse to 
an EU country which did not recognise their union27. Subsidiarity was protected, which meant that 
gender neutrality of the word ‘spouse’ was never considered by EU institutions28, thereby arguably 
meaning that free movement was not given its most extensive interpretation29. Being denied the 
status of ‘family member’30 also led to being denied the ‘plethora of benefits’31 normally accorded 
to the family members of EU citizens. This included a wide-ranging panoply of rights, ranging 
from residence32, protection from non-discrimination, and access to social assistance schemes33 
and schooling34. The division of competencies between the EU and Member States meant (and 
still means) that Member States were free to determine their own policy with regards to family 
law, including whether or not to legalise same-sex unions. In KB, the CJEU confirmed that 
pensions came within pay and the remit of relevant national legislation under Art 141 EC35. 
                                                             
22 See n. 14 – 16.  
23 See, for example, Case C-249/96 Grant v. South West Trains,(n11). This decision was heavily criticized. For 
discussion. see D. Kochenov, ‘On Options of Citizens and Moral Choices of States: Gays and European Federalism 
Fordham International Law Review 2009 Vol 33(1) p.156 at p.175 referring to N. Bamforth, ‘Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination after Grant v South-West Trains,’ Modern Law Review 2000 Vol 63 at p.720. 
24 Howard (n9) at p.61. 
25 Whilst Citizenship Directive 2004/38 Article (2(2)) included registered partners amongst family members, this was 
only strictly ‘on the basis of the legislation of a Member State if the legislation of the host Member State treats 
registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage and in accordance with the conditions laid down in the relevant 
legislation of the host Member State.’ Commentary on Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union provides that ‘[t]here is, however, no explicit requirement that domestic laws should facilitate such marriages. 
International courts and committees have so far hesitated to extend the application of the right to marry to same-sex 
couples… 
26  Relu Coman and Others v. Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrari and Others (n16).   
27  See Ibid.   
28 D. Kochenov, ‘On Options of Citizens and Moral Choice of States: Gays and European Federalism, 33(1) Fordham 
International Law Review (n.23) 2009 Vol 33(1) p.156 at p.190. 
29  See Ibid.  
30 Citizenship Directive 2004/38. 
31 See for discussion H. Stalford, ‘Concepts of Family Under EU Law – lessons from the ECHR’ International Journal 
of Law Policy and the Family 2002 Vol 16(3) p.410 at p.427. 
32 Citizenship Directive 20043/e8 article 14 (1). 
33 Citizenship Directive 2004/38 Article 14(3). 
34 Art 10 Regulation 492/2011. Also see European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, July 3rd 1974, Case C-9/74 
Casagrande. 
35 Article 141 EC provides: 1. Each Member State shall ensure that the principle of equal pay for male and female 
workers for equal work or work of equal value is applied.2. For the purpose of this Article, pay means the ordinary 
basic or minimum wage or salary and any other consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the worker receives 
directly or indirectly, in respect of his employment, from his employer....’ See, in particular, European Court of Justice, 
Grand Chamber, May 17th 1990, Case C-262/88 Barber [1990] ECR I-1889, paragraph 28, and European Court of 
Justice, Grand Chamber, September 12th 2002 Case C-351/00 Niemi [2002] ECR I-7007 at paragraph 40). 
 
   
 
   
 
However with regards to transpersons the CJEU made a clear statement that ’it is for the Member 
States to determine the conditions under which legal recognition is given to the change of gender 
of a person’36. This followed the approach of the European Court of Human Rights (’EctHR’) in 
Goodwin v United Kingdom37. The law at the time in the UK did not recognize change of gender. 
A heterosexual couple, where one partner’s sex resulted from a change of gender, were therefore 
precluded from gaining the right as beneficiary as a survivor to the pension, with no protection 
being given from EU law38. The case would be decided differently today in the UK, following 
change of legislation in the UK to recognize gender change if conditions are meet39. 
 
3. Increased Legislative Competencies of the European Union Institutions Leading to 
More Rights for LGBT Persons 
 
This article argues that the historically restrictive attitude of the CJEU towards LGBT persons is 
in the process of evolution. The driving force behind this is that the competencies of the EU to act 
have been enlarged by legislation. The EU has adopted the Charter of the Fundamental Rights 
(‘EUCFR’) at art 21(1) which includes same-sex orientation as a protected non-discrimination 
ground40.  There is also growing closeness between the EU and the Council of Europe as 
demonstrated by instances of judicial borrowing between the two institutions41. The EU requires 
compliance with human rights as part of its accession criteria and two institutions have been 
described as ‘natural partners’42. In addition, article 19 TFEU – introduced in 1999 – has also 
functioned as the legal basis for the adoption of measures to ‘combat discrimination based on sex, 
racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’ 43. 
European Union (EU) Directives adopting more detailed legislation against discrimination include 
Directive 2000/43/EC, prohibiting racial and ethnic origin discrimination, and Directive 
2000/78/EC, establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation 
prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual 
                                                             
36See KB (n12).  
37Ibid. Para 35 referring to European Court of Human Rights, July 11th 2012, App. No. 28957/95.  Goodwin v United 
Kingdom. 
38 See KB (n12).  
39 Gender Recognition Act 2004. 
40 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
41See J. Gerards, ’The Prism of Fundamental Rights‘ 8 European Constitutional Law Review 2012 Vol 8 at p.192. 
42 The European Parliamentary Assembly (1999) Building Greater Europe Without Dividing Lines’ (Opinion on the 
Report of the Committee of Wise Persons) 15 Opinion No. 208. See also T. Joris and J. Vandenberghe, ‘The Council 
of Europe and the European Union: Natural Partners or Uneasy Bedfellows?’ Colum J Eur L (2008-2009) Vol 15 p.1, 
at p.3 argue that they are increasingly active in the same fields and should therefore, according to the European 
Parliamentary Assembly, not waste resources. See European Parliamentary Assembly (2002) ‘The Council of Europe 
and the New Issues Involved in Building Europe’ Recommendation No. 1578 at para 4. See also R. Wintemute, ‘In 
Extending Human Rights, which European Court is Substantively “Braver” and Procedurally “Fitter”? The Example 
of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Discrimination’ in S. Morano-Foadi and L. Vickers (eds), Fundamental 
Rights in the EU: A Matter for Two Courts, London, Hart, 2015. 
43 Article 19 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
   
 
   
 
orientation44. Whilst Directive 2000/78/EC did not demand ‘final harmonisation… the adoption of 
the Directive meant that all Member States … had to amend existing laws… ‘45 Although the new 
Directive did not ‘arrive in a vacuum,’ the then existing 15 member states had huge variations and 
‘all kinds of laws – and social attitudes  - about sexual orientation’ discrimination in employment 
law46. Eight members states had to make additions or changes to their laws, whereas Italy and the 
UK were both member states who needed to make provisions against sexual orientation 
discrimination in employment law for the first time. Italian law implemented Directive 2000/78 
for equal treatment in employment by means of Legislative Decree No 216 and Occupation of 9 
July 2003. Numerous pieces of UK legislation implemented EU directives in this area, with the 
most relevant being the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations47. These have 
since been consolidated into the Equality Act 201048. 
The possibilities for the EU with regard to interpretating non-discrimination provisions in favour 
of LGBT persons was demonstrated early on by the Maruko case49. This considered access of a 
surviving LGBT partner to an occupational pension scheme managed by the Versorgungsanstalt 
der deutschen Buhnen (German theatre company pension organisation). The CJEU stressed the 
wide remit of Article 2 of Directive 2000/78 which provided that the principle of equal treatment 
covered both direct and indirect discrimination. Direct discrimination included the situation where 
overtly ’one person is treated less favorably than another is, has been or would be treated in a 
comparable situation [whilst] [t]here is indirect discrimination when an apparently neutral 
provision’ can ’disadvantage persons, including those of a particular sexual tendency’50. The CJEU 
found that Directive 2000/78 ’precluded legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings 
under which, after the death of his life partner, the surviving partner does not receive a survivor’s 
benefit equivalent to that granted to a surviving spouse…’51 Due regard was paid to member states 
competencies as ’it was for the referring court to determine whether a surviving life partner is in a 
situation comparable to that of a spouse who is entitled to the survivor’s benefit…’52 As Germany 
had enacted legislation on registered partnerships53, the surviving partner in Maruko was therefore 
                                                             
44 Directive 2000/43/EC,1 prohibiting racial and ethnic origin discrimination and Directive 2000/78/EC,2 establishing 
a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of 
religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation.  
45 K. Waaldijk, ‘Legislation in Fifteen EU Member States Against Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Employment: 
the Implementation of Directive 2000/7 8/EC ' Leiden, Institute of Public Law, University of Leiden, 2006 available 
at 
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/5217/6_170_056.pdf;jsessionid=F8FFB9AEC444AD0F2367
32560194582E?sequence=1 at p.17-p.18. 
46 See Ibid.  
47 The main UK laws implementing EU laws into the UK include; the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
Regulations 2003; the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 and the Employment Equality 
(Age) Regulations 2006 now all consolidated in the Equality Act 2010. 
48 Equality Act 2010. 
49 European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, April 1st 2008, Case C 267/06 Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der 
deutschen Bühnen. 
50 See Ibid para 2. 
51 See Ibid.  para 27.  
52 Ibid. Para 69. This was confirmed in the case of European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, May 10th 2011, C-
147/08 Jürgen Römer v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg but in this case the CJEU went further and carried out the 
comparability assessment themselves.  
53 (Gesetz über die Eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft) of 16 February 2001 (BGBl. 2001 I, p. 266), as amended by 
the 7 8 I ‑ 1794 JUDGMENT OF 1. 4. 2008 — CASE C-267/06 Law of 15 December 2004 (BGBl. 2004 I, p. 3396, 
   
 
   
 
able to benefit from a survivor’s pension, but this was of no assistance to LGBT persons in other 
Member States that did not have domestic legislation enabling them to formalize their relationship. 
 
4. Is there a hierarchy of protected characteristics before the CJEU? 
It is a subject of academic debate as to how progressive the CJEU has been in the development of 
LGBT rights. Some authors, such as Howard, have argued that two equality Directives introduced 
in 2000 (Dir. 2000/78 and Dir. 2000/43)54 have not led to the same level of protection’55. She 
discusses the literature on these grounds and concludes that there is a ‘…hierarchy of 
discrimination grounds… ‘56 Ultimately on this argument the prohibitions against sexual 
orientation discrimination are not as strong as those preventing other types of discrimination. The 
justification behind the argument as to the existence of a hierarchy of rights is threefold and 
involves comparisons between the two Directives57.  It is argued on this basis that the Directive 
relating to religion, belief, disability, age and sexual orientation58 (Directive 2000/78) only relates 
to employment (defined under its article 3 as including access to employment, employment and 
working conditions, vocational guidance and training and affiliation and activity)59 whereas the 
Directive concerning race or ethnic origin60 (Directive 2000/43) is much wider and not so restricted 
in scope61. Secondly, whilst the latter instrument obliges Member States to set up bodies providing 
for equal treatment, there is no corresponding requirement in Directive 2000/78 for persons 
discriminated against on the other grounds, although many EU states have introduced such bodies 
anyway62. Thirdly the Directive concerning race and ethnic origin (Dir. 2000/43)63, only allows 
discrimination to be justified in ‘two explicitly specified circumstances’64, whereas when 
considering the directive concerning, inter alia, religion and sexual orientation (Dir. 2000/78)65, 
                                                             
the ‘LPartG’), provides: ‘(1) Two persons of the same sex establish a partnership when they each declare, in person 
and in the presence of the other, that they wish to live together in partner‑ ship for life (as life partners). The 
declarations cannot be made conditionally or for a fixed period. Declarations are effective when they are made before 
the competent authority. 
54 Directive 2000/43/EC,1 prohibiting racial and ethnic origin discrimination and Directive 2000/78/EC,2 establishing 
a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of 
religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation. 
55 Howard (n9).  
56 Howard (n9) at p.61.  
57  Howard (n9). 
58 Directive 2000/78/EC,2 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation 
prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation. 
59 Directive 2000/78 Art 3.  See, U. Belavusau, ‘A Penalty Card for Homophobia from EU Non-discrimination Law: 
Comment on Asociaţia Accept (C-8/12)’, Columbia Journal of European Law (2015) Vol 21 at p.353; A. Tryfonidou, 
‘Discrimination on the Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’, in S. Vogenauer and S. Weatherill (Eds.), 
General Principles of Law: European and Comparative Perspectives London, Hart, 2017 p.386–p.387. 
60 Directive 2000/43/EC,1 prohibiting racial and ethnic origin discrimination. 
61 Howard (n9) at p.62.  
62 Howard (n9) p.62 referring to I. Chopin and C. Germaine, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Non-discrimination Law in 
Europe 2017’, European Network of Legal Experts in the Non-discrimination Field Luxembourg: Publications Office 
of the European Union, 2017 p. 108– p.114, available at https://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/4489-a-comparative-
analysis-of-non-discriminationlaw-in-europe-2017-pdf-1-35-mb.  
63   Directive 2000/43/EC. 
64 Genuine and determining occupational requirements (Article 4) and positive action (Article 5). 
65Directive 2000/78/EC, 2. 
   
 
   
 
not only are these two grounds given but also other justifications for direct discrimination are 
allowed including based on religion or belief66.  Howard’s analysis67 provides a lens for 
consideration of the CJEU judgment in NH v Lenford68.  Scrutiny is given as to whether the case 
demonstrates the CJEU operating a hierarchy of discrimination grounds and if so whether sexual 
orientation discrimination is still being treated less favourably. 
 
5. NH v Lenford: CJEU Adopting an Expansive Purposive Approach  
 
In NH v Lenford the CJEU adopted an expansive purposive interpretation of relevant legislation. 
Following the earlier case of Asociaţia Accept69 the CJEU had to consider the extent of non-
discrimination provisions contained in EU law on the basis of sexual orientation applied in the 
context of employment law.  Reference was made to the EUCFHR Article 15 which includes 
‘Freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work’70. The CJEU stressed that these 
rights had to be enjoyed in a non-discriminatory manner71. The CJEU drew attention to Recitals 
9, 11, 12, and 28 of Directive 2000/78 which emphasise that ‘employment and occupation are key 
elements in guaranteeing equal opportunities for all and contribute strongly to the full participation 
of citizens in economic, cultural and social life and to realising their potential…’72  The CJEU 
documented their purposive approach by stating the reasons behind why these provisions were in 
place. This was because ‘[d]iscrimination based on …sexual orientation may undermine the 
achievement of the objectives of the TFEU Treaty, in particular the attainment of a high level of 
employment and social protection, raising the standard of living and the quality of life, economic 
and social cohesion and solidarity and the free movement of persons…’73 The CJEU also made 
reference to the wide interpretation of what was meant by discrimination to include direct and 
indirect discrimination74. 
Of key relevant consideration in NH v Lenford was the scope of the directive and whether this 
would include statements made outside of a recruitment programme and during the course of a 
radio interview. Here, paragraph 3 of Directive 2000/78 was identified as being most relevant. 
This states the scope of the Directive relates to all ‘…conditions for access to employment, to self-
employment or to occupation, including selection criteria and recruitment conditions… ‘75 
Statements made in a radio interview were held to be included. The CJEU again took a purposive 
                                                             
66 (Under Directive 2000/78/EC, direct discrimination can be justified for the same reasons (Articles 4(1) and 7, 
respectively), but other justifications are also provided for. There is an exception for churches and other organizations 
with an ethos based on religion or belief (Article 4(2)); reasonable accommodation must be made for people with a 
disability (Article 5); direct discrimination on the ground of age can be justified in a number of situations (Article 6); 
and Article 2(5) contains a general justification clause. 
67 Howard (n9).  
68 NH v Lenford (n1).  
69 European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, April 25th 2013, Case C-81/12 Asociaţia Accept. 
70 EUCFHR Article 15. 
71  Article 21 EUCFHR. 
72 Howard (n9) at p.62.  
73  NH v Lenford (n1) paragraph 6 referring to Recital 9 of Directive 2000/78 
74 NH v Lenford (n1) paragraph 8 referring to Paragraph 2 of Directive 2000/78. 
75  Directive 2000/78 paragraph 3. 
   
 
   
 
approach, having regard to the ‘objectives…’ which Directive 2000/78 seeks to safeguard76. The 
CJEU determined that the ‘non-existence of a current or planned recruitment procedure [was] not 
decisive…’77 In so doing they reinforced their earlier decision in Asociaţia Accept ruling78. That 
case had concerned anti-gay statements given to the media by a leading personality in the context 
of potential recruitment to a Romanian football team. These were found to contravene EU 
discrimination law, a decision described as a positive advance for gay rights before the CJEU79.  
The Italian Court of Cassation in implementing the preliminary ruling from the CJEU also 
determined that statements made in the course of a radio interview fell within Directive 2000/7880. 
Interpreting relevant legislation81, the CJEU upheld the earlier judgments of the Bergamo District 
Court and the Court of Appeal Brescia which determined that the Associazione could bring the 
claim as a non-profit representative agency, even in the absence of a named victim.  This followed 
the CJEU’s earlier determination in Asociaţia Accept, which also did not involve an individual 
victim.82 In so doing the CJEU offered a purposive and extensive interpretation of relevant EU 
law, without which, the legislation would have had far less effect. If an individual victim was 
required to be named, this would have meant ‘outing’ the individual with all the attendant publicity 
and potential negative impact from their existing employers. This was also implemented by the 
Italian Court of Cassation.83  
In NH v Lenford, anti-gay statements made to the media, outside of a recruitment procedure, were 
also seen as relevant ‘conditions for access of employment’ within the scope of Article 3 
Directive.84 The CJEU stressed that what was of importance was the pre-selection of the applicants 
themselves in determining whether or not to apply for a job85. The CJEU followed closely 
Advocate General Sharpston’s Opinion, where she had considered that often the ‘greatest force in 
an employment decision is the applicant’s decision to apply’86. An additional issue in the case in 
hand, was that following the radio interview ‘the employer did not clearly distance itself from the 
statements concerned…’87 The CJEU looked carefully at the factors which would establish 
whether there was a sufficient ‘link’ between the statements made in the radio interview and the 
employment opportunities. Close reference was made to Advocate General Sharpston’s Opinion88. 
Relevant categories in consideration of establishing a link included consideration of the ‘status of 
                                                             
76 NH v Lenford (n1) paragraph 34.  
77 NH v Lenford (n1) paragraph 43.  
78 Asociaţia Accept (n69). 
79  See, U. Belavusau, ‘A Penalty Card for Homophobia from EU Non-discrimination Law: Comment on Asociaţia 
Accept (C-8/12)’, Columbia Journal of European Law 2015 Vol 33 at p.353; A. Tryfonidou, ‘Discrimination on the 
Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’, in S. Vogenauer and S. Weatherill (Eds.), General Principles of 
Law: European and Comparative Perspectives, London, Hart, 2017, p386– p.387. 
80  Italian Court of Cassation, Section I Civil Ordinance 15 December 2020, n. 28646. 
81 Commission Recommendation 2013/394/EU of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under 
Union Law (OJ 2013 L 201, at 60) ‘Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress.’ 
82 Asociaţia Accept (n69). 
83 Italian Court of Cassation, Section I Civil Ordinance 15 December 2020, n. 28646 n6.  
84 Directive 2000/78 paragraph 3. 
85 NH v Lenford (n1) paragraph 40. 
86 Advocate General Sharpston’s Opinion in NH v Lenford (n1) paragraph 65 to 69.  
87 NH v Lenford (n1) paragraph 43.   
88 NH v Lenford (n1) paragraph 40 referring to paragraph 53 to 56 Advocate General Sharpston’s Opinion. 
   
 
   
 
the person making the statements, …the capacity in which he or she made them, establish[ment] 
of… he or she as a potential employer or is, in law or in fact, capable of exerting a decisive 
influence on the recruitment policy… or, at the very least, may be perceived by the public of the 
social groups concerned as being capable of exerting such influence, even if he or she does not 
have the legal capacity to define the recruitment policy of the employer concerned or bind or 
represent that employer in recruitment matters…’89 In NH v Lenford the CJEU determined that 
there was a sufficient link because the statement was made by a senior member of staff. The CJEU 
concluded that if firms could avoid liability for words made in interview because they ‘allegedly 
constitute the expression of a personal opinion… the very essence of the protection afforded by 
that directive in matter of employment and occupation would become illusory’90. In so doing the 
CJEU endorsed AG Sharpston’s opinion, that ‘offhand remarks, particularly those which claim to 
be purely opinions, or humorous, [could] constitute discrimination…’91As Powell comments, the 
CJEU following AG Sharpston ‘…reject[ed] emphatically the proposition that a ‘humorous’ 
discriminatory statement somehow ‘does not count’ or is acceptable. Humour is a powerful 
instrument and can all too easily be abused’92. 
In determining the discretion left to them following the preliminary ruling, the Italian Court of 
Cassation found a link between the statements made and the employer because of the  status of the 
person making the statement which ‘configures him as a potential employer’ together with ‘the 
nature and content of the declarations in questions,… which must refer to the conditions of access 
to employment and work and demonstrate the intention to discriminate, and finally, the context in 
which the declarations have been made, in particular their public or private character, and also the 
fact that they have been disseminated to the public…’93 The Italian Court of Cassation concluded 
that the connection of the lawyer Taormina with the firm in question was not ‘merely 
hypothetical…’ [as] ‘[i]n fact, he was the owner of such a firm and practiced the legal profession 
and therefore was potentially a possible employer and contractor of collaborators’94. 
 
6. NH v Lenford Dealing with the Freedom of Expression Argument  
 
In NH v Lenford, the CJEU had to interpret various conflicting provisions under EU law. An 
important consideration in relation to statements made in a radio interview were the guarantees 
under the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Human Rights (‘EUCFHR’). Article 11 
guarantees the right to freedom of expression.  This right includes ‘freedom to hold opinions and 
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless 
                                                             
89 NH v Lenford (n1) paragraph 44.  
90 NH v Lenford (n1) paragraph 54.  
91 C. Powell, Discrimination Law Association Briefings March 2020 Vol 69 at p925.  
92 Advocate General Sharpston’s Opinion as discussed by Claire Powell Discrimination Law Association Briefings 
925 March 2020 Vol 69. 
93 Italian Court of Cassation, Section I Civil Ordinance 15 December 2020, n. 28646 (n6) at para 5.7 judgment  
94 Ibid. para 5.8.  
   
 
   
 
of frontiers…’95 Freedom of expression is also guaranteed under the Italian constitution96. This 
was of crucial importance to the NH v Lenford case as the lawyer argued that the statements made 
were part of the exercise of freedom of expression by the lawyer in question, guaranteed by the 
Italian constitution97.  The Court of Cassation in implementing the preliminary ruling received 
back from the CJEU in NH v Lenford emphasized statements made by the CJEU which recognizes 
that ‘freedom of expression [is] considered an essential foundation of a democratic and pluralist 
society reflecting the values on which the Union is founded, pursuant to art 2 TEU and art 11 of 
the Charter)98. The CJEU found that homophobic speech of the lawyer NH fell within Article 11, 
but had to be balanced against other rights protected by the Charter99.  The Italian Court of 
Cassation also followed a similar approach, referring to the principle of proportionality and that 
freedom of expression had to be balanced against other rights, in this case protection from 
discrimination on the prohibited grounds listed. Ultimately, the Italian Court of Cassation 
concluded that such restrictions on freedom of expression could be justified in order to guarantee 
the employment rights of those with protected characteristics, such as LGBT persons in the case 
under consideration100. 
It remains debatable as to whether balancing freedom of expression and protection of labour rights 
has struck the right approach. It can be argued that the approach taken by the CJEU and the Italian 
Court of Cassation does not go far enough. Tryfonidou suggests that NH’s comments amounted to 
‘hate speech’ and should not have been held to fall within the remit of Article 11 at all101. 
Tryfonidou argues that the approach currently taken ‘…seems to imply that freedom to engage in 
homophobic speech needs to be protected as an aspect of the freedom of expression which means 
that it can be deemed acceptable under certain circumstances…’102 Yet, in finding the speech fell 
within Article 11 but balancing this against other rights protected in the EUCFHR, the CJEU is 
following the approach of EctHR case law. The EctHR often finds that extreme speech falls within 
free speech grounds103, but considers restrictions in an exercise known as the proportionality 
balancing exercise104.  
                                                             
95 EU Charter of Fundamental Human Rights states that ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right 
shall include freedom to hold opinion and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers…’. 
96  The Constitution of the Italian Republic (Italian: Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana) enacted by the Constituent 
Assembly on 22 December 1947 Freedom of expression Protected by the Art. 21 of the Italian Constitution, ‘…anyone 
has the right to freely express their thoughts in speech, writing, or any other form of communication.’  
97 Italian Court of Cassation, Section I Civil Ordinance 15 December 2020, n. 28646 (n6) at para 5.9 judgment  
98 Ibid. at para 5.10. referring to NH v Lenford (n1) and also European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, C-163/10, 
September 6th 2011, Patriciello, at para 31). 
99 NH v Lenford (n1). 
100  Italian Court of Cassation, Section I Civil Ordinance 15 December 2020, n. 28646 (n6). 
101 A. Tryfonidou, ‘Homophobic Speech and EU Anti-Discrimination Law: The NH case’ Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 2020 Vol 27(4) p.1 – p.9.  
 102Ibid. at 7.  
103 European Court of Human Rights, Application No 5493/72, December 7th 1976, Handyside v United Kingdom, at 
paragraph 49 states that Article 10 is applicable to  ‘’ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or 
a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population…’  
104 Article 10 paragraph 2 provides that ‘[t]he exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of 
   
 
   
 
Others critique the decision by the CJEU in NH v Lenford as ‘being lopsided [because it] embraced 
a surprisingly broad interpretation of the scope of EU anti-discrimination law at the expense of 
downplaying potential threats to freedom of expression’105. In NH, in considering restrictions to 
Article 11, the CJEU placed stress on the importance of non-discrimination grounds contained in 
Article 21. The latter prohibits discrimination on any ‘ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or 
social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, members 
of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation’106. Article 21 EUCFHR 
is a strong statement as it is ‘free-standing’ and explicitly contains sexual orientation as a protected 
ground of non-discrimination. This is in contrast to the equivalent provision in Article 14 European 
Convention of Human Rights (‘European Convention’) which is a ‘conditional’ right only. This 
means that whilst Article 14 prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of any other European 
Convention rights, enforcement is dependent on another breach of human rights argument being 
made, although it does not actually require an independent proven breach of that right107. 
Moreover, Article 14 of the European Convention, which was drafted in the 1950s, does not 
mention sexual orientation as one of the protected grounds. This has meant that the EctHR has had 
to engage in dynamic and imaginative interpretation of the European Convention under an 
extended line of case law in order to protect LGBT persons by including ‘sexual orientation’ within 
the grounds of ‘sex’ or ‘other status’108. Given the explicit reference to sexual orientation as a 
ground of discrimination in EU law this is not necessary. This has led to commentators describing 
the European Union as engaging in a ‘rights revolution…’109 In operating the proportionality 
balancing exercise between freedom of expression and protection from discrimination for LGBT 
persons and deciding in favour of the latter, the CJEU is moving one step further in its evolution 
of sexual orientation non-discrimination protection.  
 
7. Case law analysis demonstrating more restrictive interpretations of non-
discrimination law by the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) 
 
Not all CJEU case law has adopted an expansive interpretation of non-discrimination provisions110. 
In Parris v Trinity College Dublin, it was ruled that Parris was unable to claim for ‘multiple or 
                                                             
others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary…’ 
105 See J. Miller, ’Op-Ed: “In a tight spot, the Court of Justice Delivers a Lopsided Judgment: NH v Associazione 
Avvocatura per i diritti LGBTI — Rete Lenford” April 2020 Employment and Immigration and Human Rights available 
at Op-Ed: “In a tight spot, the Court of Justice delivers a lopsided judgment: NH v Associazione Avvocatura per i 
diritti LGBTI — Rete Lenford” by Jeffrey Miller - EU Law Live. 
106 Article 21 EU Charter of Fundamental Human Rights of the European Union.  
107 Article 14 provides that “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the Human Rights Act shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, 
birth or other status”. 
108 See for example European Court of Human Rights, October 22nd 1981, Application No 7525/76 Dudgeon v United 
Kingdom and European Court of Human Rights, July 24th 2003, Application no. 40016/98 Karner v Austria. 
109 For discussion, see M. Dawson, E. Muir, and M. Claes, ‘Enforcing the EU’s Rights Revolution; the Case of 
Equality’ European Human Rights Law Review 2012 Vol 3 p.276. 
110 See Howard (n9) for discussion.  
   
 
   
 
intersectional discrimination’ attempting to combine the grounds of sexual orientation and age 
discrimination111. Trinity College Dublin only allowed payment of survivor’s pensions, providing 
the marriage or civil partnership had been entered into before the age of 60. Since same-sex civil 
partnerships were only introduced in Ireland in 2011, this meant that only the same-sex civil 
partner of an employee who was born after 1951, could claim a survivor’s pension. Although Mr 
Parris had been in a relationship for 30 years, he only got civil partnered after the Civil Partnership 
Act 2010 came into force in the Republic of Ireland, when Mr Parris was 63 and just after he had 
retired. Trinity College Dublin refused his request for his partner to have his survivor’s pension. 
Rejecting the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott who would have found ‘…indirect sexual 
orientation discrimination as well as direct age discrimination…’112, the CJEU refused Parris’ 
claim as they would not allow a combination of sexual orientation and age discrimination113. 
Tryfonidou comments that the decision ‘demonstrates the [CJEU’s] failure to accept the reality of 
multiple discrimination’114. Howard gives the Parris case as an example of restrictive analysis by 
the CJEU of equality provisions and also cites as further evidence of this approach, restrictive case 
law from the CJEU concerning Muslim women wishing to wear veils in the workplace115. In 
Achbita the complainant challenged her employer’s rule that no one was able to wear ‘…visible 
signs of political, philosophical or religious beliefs…’116 Ultimately her refusal to obey resulted in 
her losing her employment. When interpreting Directive 2000/78 the CJEU found that the 
employer’s rule did not result in direct discrimination because all workers were treated equally117. 
No indirect discrimination was found either, as any undue burden could be supported by the 
legitimate aim of supporting the employer’s relationship with its customers118. Howard, when 
writing in 2018, subsequently stated that in areas of contention surrounding same-sex marriage 
and the wearing of headscarves that the ‘CJEU wants to tread carefully… and try to find a way of 
deciding these cases which can be supported by majority of Member States…’119 Ultimately, she 
concluded that the ‘hierarchy of discrimination grounds’ still existed and ‘that the protection 
against discrimination on some grounds is stronger than others’120 with protection from sexual 
orientation discrimination being low down the list of protected grounds.  She considered that the 
case law of the CJEU ‘contributed to this hierarchy rather than challenging it’121. The next section 
                                                             
111 European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, November 24th 2016, C-443/15 Parris v Trinity College Dublin. 
112 Howard (n9) at 69 discussing Parris v. Trinity College Dublin (n111), Opinion Advocate General Kokott 
paragraphs 110, 146, and 159. 
113 See for discussion D. Lahuerta Shiek, S. Benedi and A. Zybyszewska, ‘On Uses, Mis-Uses and Non-Uses of 
Intersectionality before the Court of Justice (EU)’, International Journal of Discrimination and the Law, 2018-06, 
Vol 18 (2-3) p.82-p.103. 
114  See Howard (n9) referring to A. Tryfonidou, ‘Awaiting the ECJ Judgment in Coman: Towards the Cross-Border 
Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages in the EU?’, EU Law Analysis March 2017 available at EU Law Analysis: 
Awaiting the ECJ Judgment in Coman: Towards the Cross-Border Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages in the 
EU? 
115 Howard (n9) referring to European Court Justice, Grand Chamber, March 14th 2017, Case C-157/15 Achbita v. 
G4S and European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, March 14th 2017, C-188/15 Bougnaoui v. Micropole  
116  Ibid.  
117 Ibid. The CJEU was interpreting Directive 2004/43 including the general framework for combating discrimination 
on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards employment or occupation. 
118 Ibid.  
119 Howard (n9) at p.74.  
120 Howard (n9) at p.74.  
121 Howard (n9) at p.74.  
   
 
   
 
investigates more recent case law from the CJEU demonstrating a more positive impact for LGBT 
persons. 
 
8. CJEU judgments resulting in favourable outcomes for LGBT persons 
 
More recently the CJEU has reached judgments resulting in favourable outcomes for LGBT 
persons. Of great prominence in this area is the high-profile case of Relu Coman and Others v. 
Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrari and Others (‘Coman’)122. In the area of family law the EU 
system defers to subsidiarity and the rights of member states to choose whether to legalise same-
sex marriage123. However, in Coman the CJEU extended free movement and residence rights to 
the non-EU citizen same-sex spouse of a migrant Union citizen124. The CJEU determined that a 
non-EU citizen same-sex spouse must be granted the right to reside in Romania for more than 3 
months, following the relocation of their EU citizen same-sex spouse to that Member State. This 
was the case even though Romania does not recognize same-sex marriages or partnerships 
domestically. Although the CJEU judgment in no way required EU states to introduced same-sex 
marriage in their own territory (but only to provide recognition – for the purpose of the grant of 
family reunification rights – to same-sex marriages contracted in other EU Member States), it has 
enhanced EU free movement rights for same sex couples. Tryfonidou comments on the inherent 
‘symbolic value’ of Coman125.  
Further in another move forwards for LGBT rights before the CJEU, in MB v Secretary of State 
for Work and Pensions (‘the MB case’) the CJEU ruled that trans citizens are entitled to acquire 
state pension at the age of their acquired gender126. The case concerned the requirement under the 
UK Gender Recognition Act 2004, for transpersons to annul their marriage before they would be 
granted a Gender Recognition Certificate in their new sex127.  This was pre same-sex marriage 
being 14ecognize in the UK in 2013. However, many individuals naturally did not wish to annul 
their marriages, and so did not obtain Gender Recognition Certificates. Consequently, as they were 
not 14ecognizes in their new sex, they were not able to claim their pension at the age of 60, the 
lower age given to women pre pension reform. In MB a complaint was made that the UK position 
contravened Article 4 of Directive 79/7 which prohibits all forms of discrimination on grounds of 
                                                             
122 Coman (n16).  
123 See for instance commentary on art 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union which states 
that Member States do not have an ‘explicit requirement to facilitate [same-sex] marriages’. 
124 Coman (n16) paragraph 56. 
125 A. Tryfonidou, ‘The EU Top Court Rules that Married Same-Sex Couples can Move Freely between EU Member 
states as Spouses’ Case C673/16 Relue Adrian Coman Robert Clabourt Hamilton, Asocitia Accept v Inspectoraturl 
general pentru Imigrarri, Ministerul Afaceriolor Interne Feminist Legal Studies 2019 Vol 27 (2) p.211-p.22. 
126  European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, June 26th 2018, Case C-451/16. MB v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions.  
127Section 4 Gender Recognition Act 2004 as discussed in the (see the MB case (n126) para 29). The Gender 
Recognition Act 2004 therefore provided that in order to obtain a full gender recognition certificate not only did strict 
medical conditions have to be met but that also that a married applicant had to have their marriage annulled by the 
court (ss 4(3) and 5, GRA 2004). This provision was only reformed following the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 
2013, Sch 5 of which amended s 4 of the GRA 2004 to provide that a full gender recognition certificate could be 
issued to a married applicant if their spouse consents. 
   
 
   
 
sex as regards social security. The CJEU, although confining their decisions to non-discrimination 
in state pension age128, and not transgressing on state competencies in family law, followed a 
progressive approach to transpersons129. The CJEU determined in MB that transpersons are able 
to benefit from the progressive implementation of the principle of equality between sexes in 
matters of social security, therefore being able to acquire the state pension at the lower age of their 
acquired gender.   
 
9. NH v Lenford: One step further towards levelling the hierarchy of protected rights 
 
Howard argues that one of the reasons for the existence of a hierarchy of protected discrimination 
grounds, is that Directive 2000/78/EC, which prohibits religion, belief, disability, age and sexual 
orientation discrimination, only relates to employment, whereas Directive 2000/43/EC, prohibiting 
racial and ethnic origin discrimination, is much wider and not so restricted in its material scope130. 
It is therefore of interest to the analysis in this piece how the CJEU justified their extensive 
interpretation of EU law in NH v Lenford131. In the latter case, the CJEU made reference to a wide 
range of legislation and case law concerning not only sexual discrimination in employment law 
but also the interpretation of Directive 2000/43 on equal treatment of persons irrespective of racial 
or ethnic origin132. Rather than treating sexual orientation discrimination as lower down the 
hierarchy than other types of discrimination133, these were treated in a similar manner, with lessons 
to learn from one area translated to another.  In NH v Lenford, the CJEU justified their expansive 
purposive approach by referring to the cases of Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn134 and CHEZ 
Razpredelenie Bulgaria135, both of which concerned Directive 2000/43 on equal treatment of 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. In the former case the CJEU made a strong statement 
endorsing the importance of equality and the necessity of its wide-ranging interpretation. The 
CJEU stated that the Directive was ‘an expression, within the area under consideration, of the 
principle of equality, which is one of the general principles of European Union law, as recognised 
in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [thus] the scope of that 
directive cannot be defined restrictively…’136 The subject matter of the case however, which 
concerned national rules about the spelling of a person’s surnames and forenames and the entering 
of these onto civil status certificates, only in a form governed by the spelling of the official national 
language, related to a situation outside of the scope of Directive 2000/43137.  
                                                             
128 MB (n126) paragraph 27. 
129 This reflects CJEU earlier case law concerning transpersons. See European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, April 
30th 1996, Case C-13/94 P v S and Cornwall County Council. 
130 Howard (n9) referring to Directive 2000/78/EC,2 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual 
orientation and Directive 2000/43/EC,1 prohibiting racial and ethnic origin discrimination. 
131  NH v Lenford (n1).  
132 Directive 2004/43 on equal treatment of persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. 
133 As suggested by Howard (n6). 
134 European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, May 12th 2011, C‑391/09.Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn. 
135 European Court of Justice, Grand Chamber July 16th 2015, C‑83/14.CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria. 
136 Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn (n134) paragraph 43.  
137 Ibid Paragraph 44.  
   
 
   
 
Ultimately however it was the principle of a wide interpretation of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin which was endorsed subsequently in the case of CHEZ 
Razpredelenie Bulgari138. Once again reference was made to the fact that the ‘principle of equality, 
which is one of the general principles of EU law, as recognised in Article 21 of the Charter, … 
cannot be defined restrictively…’139  Consequently, the facts of the case, which concerned the 
installation of electricity meters, were found to fall within the wide scope of the Directive. The 
subject matter of the dispute concerned a complaint that the electricity meters were installed at a 
height of between six or seven meters in the area of Dupnista (Bulgaria) whereas in other areas of 
the country this was a height of 1.7 meters.  The residents of Dupnista argued that this meant they 
were overcharged as they were unable to check their consumption. Discrimination was alleged as 
Dupnista was primarily a Roma town. Ultimately the CJEU determined that such a measure would 
constitute direct discrimination140. Both cases were given as examples by the CJEU in NH, 
militating against ‘restrictive’ interpretations of equality provisions and justifying a wider 
purposive approach to sexual orientation discrimination141. Sexual orientation discrimination was 
not seen as lower down the hierarchy than other protected rights.  
 
10 Brexit and Trade and Cooperation Agreement 
 
As a British author, this article also considers the position following Brexit. For a wider audience 
the points are also relevant as they illustrate how far EU legislation and CJEU judgments have 
forced Member States to protect LGBT rights. Following Brexit, all EU law already incorporated 
into UK legislation will be retained142. New EU legislation and judgments from the CJEU will no 
longer apply automatically in the UK. In certain constrained ways under the terms of the TCA the 
EU and the UK will arguably continue to maintain limited influence over each other in the area of 
LGBT non-discrimination in employment143. Three points are worth noting here. Firstly both 
parties have agreed to uphold ‘shared values, principles of democracy and the rule of law, and 
respect for human rights…’144 Whilst the European Convention is not specifically mentioned, it 
would seem to come under the reference to international human rights treaties made. Any 
judgments of the EctHR concerning discrimination against LGBT persons would therefore apply 
to both the UK and the EU. However, where arguably the EU is developing case law exceeding 
the protections from the EctHR this would not take automatic effect in the UK.  
Secondly, in relation to ‘labour and social levels of protection‘ more specifically defined to include 
– of relevance to this piece – ‘(a) fundamental rights at work and …(c) fair working conditions 
                                                             
138 CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria (n135).  
139  Ibid. paragraph 42. 
140 CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria,(n135) unless being capable of being objectively justified by the intention to ensure 
the security of the electricity transmission network and the due recording of electricity consumption. 
141 NH v Lenford (n1). 
142 European Union (Withdrawal Act) 2018.  
143 Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the UK.  
144 Ibid. Article LAW.GEN.3: Protection of human rights and fundamental freedom. 
   
 
   
 
and employment standards’145, the parties commit to a non-regression clause. The parties agree 
not to ’weaken or reduce in a manner affecting trade or investment between the Parties, [their] 
labour and social levels of protection below the levels in place at the end of the transition 
period…’146  In addition, the parties affirm their commitment to promoting and respecting core 
labour standards of relevance to this piece inducing ’elimination of discrimination in respect of 
employment and occupation’147 as further defined in International Labour Organisation 
documents148. It remains to be seen what effect these provisions will have in reality. The point in 
time for judgment of non-regression to be measured is as at the end of the transition period 31 
December 2020. Even then much reference is given under the agreement in the TCA to the ’right 
of each Party to set its policies and priorities149’ and to ’exercise reasonable discretion and make 
bona fide decisions’150. In order for the TCA to have any effect the alleged regression must affect 
’trade or investment between the parties’151. It is unclear when this test would be met and it is 
difficult to envisage that differences in LGBT non-discrimination laws would meet this seemingly 
high and yet to be defined standard. In relation to both the non-regression clause and commitment 
to ILO standards there is a special rule on dispute settlement which requires the parties to refer the 
matter to a panel of experts152. Ultimately the panel’s decisions are toothless as all they can do is 
make recommendations in their report. However a negative judgment could result in political 
impact. Further the parties have agreed that where the responding party ’chooses not to take any 
action in conformity with the panel of experts report… they may use the remedies authorised under 
Article Inst. 24’153. This includes the ability of the winning party to request compensation or 
suspension of obligations154.  
Thirdly, although the TCA recognises the ‘right of each Party to determine its future policies and 
priorities with respect to labour and social control…’155 the  TCA also refers to the possibility of 
‘rebalancing’ in the event of significant divergences following future developments in labour 
law156. The latter however is subject again to the same special rules on arbitration and a different 
(higher) threshold to show that divergence affects trade or investment resulting in ‘significant 
divergences../.[which have change[d] the circumstances that have formed the basis for the 
conclusion of this Agreement’157.  If this then results in a ’material impact on trade or investment’ 
                                                             
145 Trade and Cooperation Agreement Labour and social standards Article 6.1: Definition 1. For the purposes of this 
Chapter, “labour and social levels of protection” means the levels of protection provided overall in a Party’s law and 
standards, in each of the following areas: (a) fundamental rights at work; (b) occupational health and safety standards; 
(c) fair working conditions and employment standards; (d) information and consultation rights at company level; or 
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146 Trade and Cooperation Agreement 6.2.  
147 Trade and Cooperation Agreement Article 8.3: Multilateral labour standards and agreements Article 8.3. Paragraph 
2(d). 
148 Ibid.  referring to International Labour Constitution and International Labour Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up adopted at Geneva on 18 June 1999. 
149 TCA Article 6.2: Non-regression from levels of protection para 1 
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154 Article INST.24: Temporary Remedies para 2 and 3 
155 Article 9.4 Rebalancing para 1 
156  Trade and Cooperation Agreement Article 9.4 Rebalancing.  
157 Ibid. Para 1 
   
 
   
 
the Parties are then able to take ’appropriate rebalancing measures to address the situation… 
[although these measures are] restricted to their scope and duration to what is strictly necessary 
and proportionate to remedy the situation’158. Once again it is difficult to envisage that future 
developments in LGBT non-discrimination laws would meet the yet undefined but seemingly even 
higher standards required to trigger the rebalancing clause. So therefore whilst the TCA does offer 





In NH v Lenford the CJEU determined that homophobic statements made in the course of a radio 
interview contravened relevant non-discrimination in employment law provisions in EU 
legislation159. This was despite the fact that these statements were made outside of a recruitment 
campaign and with no job offer having been made. What was of importance was that the statements 
were made by a person perceived to have influence on recruitment policy, which could prejudice 
applicants in deciding against future job applications160.  Compensation was also payable to a non-
profit representative agency, therefore also widening the group of applicants who could bring 
cases161. The Italian Court of Cassation implemented the CJEU preliminary reference determining 
that there was a link between the statements made in the radio interview and employment, despite 
no ongoing recruitment campaign162. They also, following the CJEU, determined that freedom of 
expression guaranteed by the Italian constitution, had to be balanced against other rights, in this 
case protection from discrimination on the prohibited grounds listed, and that the latter 
prevailed163. It is argued that NH v Lenford is one further step in the continuing evolution of sexual 
orientation discrimination before the European Union, following extensive furthering of EU 
legislative tools including the EUCFHR (where sexual orientation is specifically listed as a 
protected ground of discrimination)164 and a directive (Directive 2000/78) prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. This expansive purposive approach adopted by 
the CJEU in NH v Lenford corresponds with that of the CJEU in other areas, although strict respect 
for member state competencies in family law is maintained165. 
Other authors argue that a hierarchy of protected characteristics exists, with LGBT discrimination 
least protected166. Analysis of the reasoning used by the CJEU in the NH v Lenford case, 
demonstrates that in making an extensive interpretation of non-discrimination provisions, the 
CJEU drew upon a wide range of case law to support their position167. Examples were taken from 
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the area of non-discrimination on the basis of race and ethnic groups and these were held to justify 
a purposive approach in the area of sexual orientation discrimination168. The author would suggest 
that it is difficult to maintain the argument that a hierarchy of protected grounds still exists. This 
methodology, of borrowing precedents from a wide area of protected characteristics, will also be 
of use in assisting the CJEU in further development of non-discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation. Following Brexit, whilst under the terms of the European Union (Withdrawal Act) 
2018, all existing EU law will be retained in UK domestic legislation169,  future EU legislation and 
judgments from the CJEU will no longer have immediate effect in the UK. Under the terms of the 
TCA provisions relating to human rights170, non-regression clause in relation to labour rights171 
and rebalancing provisions in respect of future divergences in labour law172 lead to the possibility 
of the UK and EU continue to affect each other in the area of LGBT non-discrimination law. In 
practice however there are significant hurdles to be overcome before arbitration or ultimately 
suspensions or fines are triggered, including requiring effect on ’trade or investment between the 
parties’173, as regards non-regression, and ’significant divergence’ in labour law leading to a 
’material impact on trade or investment’, as regards rebalancing174. Going forwards UK citizens 
will no longer be able to benefit from such interventions from the CJEU as seen in NH v Lenford175, 
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